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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

TmE PERvORMANcE OF A LtGAL OBLIGATION AS CONSIDERATION FOR A PRoMof the common
isE.-At a time when the true reasonableness
law and its responsiveness to the actualities of life are under
-criticism, it is interesting to find several cases, within the past year,.
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affirming the old rule that performance of a legal duty is not consideration
for a promise. In Vance v. Ellison, (V. Va.) 85 S. E. 776, suit was brought
to enjoin the enforcement of a deed of trust executed by plaintiff to defendant, to secure payment of $iooo promised for legal services. It was admitted that when the deed was executed the defendant was already bound
by a written contract to perform them for $500. Upon this showing the
court held the deed to be without consideration, saying, "The doing of
what one is already bound to do does not constitute good consideration for
a promise." The same conclusion, on very similar circumstances was
reached in Mitir v. Morris, (Ore.) 154 Pac. 117, (Jan., i9i6) and in Village of
Seneca Falls v. Botsch, 149 N. Y. Supp. 320. In Benedict v. Greer-Robbins Co.,
26 Cal. App. 468, 147 Pac. 486, it was held that payment of a part of money
due under a conditional sale contract, was not such consideration for an
agreement to extend the contract as would deprive the vendor of his right
to retake the property sold, before the expiration of the extension.
The rule that payment of money already due is not consideration for a
promise induced by it is thoroughly established. Lord BLACKBURN said of the
rule that in his opinion it developed originally from a mistake. Foakes v.
Beer, 9 App. Cas. 6o5. This same view is taken by Professor A.Es, who implies that its application has been a disappointment to the reasonable expectations of business men. Two THEORIES Or CONSIDERATION, 12 HARv. LAW
RzV. 5r5, 521. It has been changed by statute in a number of states, but it
has been repudiated by judicial action in only two jurisdictions, Mississippi and
New Hampshire. Clayton v Clark, 74 Miss 499; Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H.
358. Even Lord BLACKBURN felt himself bound to follow the rule, and Mr.
Justice POTER, delivering the opinion in Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, said
that although the courts in following the rule "have rarely failed upon any
recurrence of the question to criticise and condemn its reasonableness, justice,
fairness and honesty, [yet] no respectable authority that I have been able to
find has, after such unanimous disapproval by all the courts, held otherwise. * * * The steadfast 'adhesion to this doctrine by the courts, in spite
of the current of condemnation of the individual judges of the court, and
in the face of the demands end conveniences of a much greater business and
more extensive mercantile dealings and operations, demonstrates the force
of the doctrine of stare deoisis" Trombley v. Klersey, 141 Mich. 73; Sands
v. Gilleran, 144 N. Y. S. 337; Estate of Casner, I Cal. App. 145.
If it be true that the rule is really unjust and harmful, and is retained
only by the operation of the doctrine of stare decisis, criticism of the law in
general, as independent of justice and as obsolete, is not wholly-without
reason. It seems possible, however, that the courts may have *been, albeit
intuitively and unconsciously, actuated by some other motive than the doctrine of stare decisis in holding to the rule.
There is no particular reason for applying that doctrine so vigorously in
these cases. The rule is not one of property; indeed it is not one on which
the promisor could allege a reliance in any event. To do so would be, in
itself, an admission of fraud on his part,-a confession that he had made a
promise which he knew to be legally unenforcible, and which he did not
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intend to keep, in order to induce an action, of value to him, on the part
of the promisor. Its repudiation, then, would affect no rights; neither would
it be in violation of any theory of the law. Even BLACKSTONX, in declaring
the eternal immutability of law as once declared, admitted that a rule which
had been unreasonable at its inception might be repudiated, as being not
law. Despite this the rule has been consistently maintained.
In its more general form of statement, the rule has even met with comparatively. little criticism. It has been departed from wherever opportunity
offered, and courts have seized such opportunity with avidity, but, with the
exception already noted and a few sporadic cases, all departure can be
logically ascribed to the fact that there really is a consideration-that the
promisee has done something other than his legal obligation required.
The obligation created by a prior contract is not to do the thing expressly
set forth in the agreement, but to do that or else to pay damages for not
doing it. Even though "legal obligation" be converse to the right rather than
to the remedy, yet when a right is -conferred by agreement, it is fair to
presume that the form of the remedy was in contemplation of both parties
as determining the extent of the right so conferred, and; hence, indirectly,
of the obligation. The remedy has been so long confined to a money recompense only, that undoubtedly a contractor relies on the fact that if unforseen
obstacles -to the performance as expressed should arise, he has a legal escape
therefrom by payment of all damage resulting from non-performance in
form. The truth of this is not demonstrable; but at least it is pragmatically
true, and if it be assumed, it furnishes a logical ground of distinction of certain cases. Mr. Justice Horids, in discussing the law of contract, takes this
view and says, in effect, that all promises are reducible ultimately to an assur'ance that the promisor will be answerable in damages if the thing promised
shall not come to pass. THm CO MON LAw. See also Chellis v. Grimes, 72
N. H. io5. In the case of Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, the court in discussing the rule that performance of an obligation is not consideration, says,
"The confusion arises from a failure to distinguish between legal and moral
obligations. One-may be morally bound to do precisely in terms as he
agrees; but he is legally bound to do, as a practical proposition, whatever
the theory may be, only what he can be compelled by law to do. The common law does not compel men to do as they agree. It gives damages for
failure to perform legal or contractual duties but except in a few instances
only can the specific performance of the contract be enforced." The court
then proceeds to demonstrate that the maker of a promissory note is not
obligated by law to pay the note, but that only damages for the non-payment
are recoverable. This may be true in theory, but practically the recovery is
an enforcement of 'payment of the note. The damages recovered and the
amount due on the note are too nearly identical for a real distinction to be
possible. Hence, in such cases, the person owing a debt has no choice but to
pay it whether- payment be made in forma or under the name of damages.
Conversely, the creditor receives by voluntary payment to him, nothing other,
save in name, than he would have received through the action of the law.
-But when, on the other hand, the debtor is in a position to go into bank-
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Tuptcy, the law does give' him a real option as to his course of action. He
may pay his debt according to the form of his obligation, or he may be
discharged from it by proceedings in bankruptcy. When he does pay his
Adebt, under such circumstances, he really, not merely nominally, does something which he is not legally bound to do; he foregoes his right to an
absolutely legal escape from paying according to the exact terms of his
agreement. This forbearance to exercise an. option is generally held to be
.aconsideration for a promise, though it is not always so expressed. Melroy
v. Kemmerer, 218 Pa. 381, I L. R. A. (N.,S.) ioi8, 67 At. 699; Engbretson v.
Seiberling, 122 Iowa 522, io Am. St. Rep. 279; Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358
Such is also the fact in respect to contracts to do something other than
the payment of money. In these instances the contractor has two possible
-courses of action, either one of which will absolutely and effectually discharge
his obligation. He may carry out his agreement according to its express
terms, or he may pay damages, and the choice lies with him. Many cases
hold that performance as expressed will support a contract. The case of
Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns (N. Y.) 330, arose out of a suit to enforce
a promise given in consideration that the promisee would complete certain
,vork which he was already under contract to do. The court sustained the
action, saying, "By the former contract, the plaintiffs subjected themselves to a
certain penalty for the non-fulfillment, and if they chose to incur this
penalty they had a right to do so. * * * Here was a sufficient consideration
for thi§ promise.! In Linz v. Schuck, io6 Md. 22o, the court based a similar
'holding on the ground that the original contract had been mutually rescinded,
and the doing of the work was a new consideration for the new promise.
Agel v. Patch Manufacturing Co., 77 Vt. 13. "The prevailing rule seems to
'be, that such a promise is valid, as an abandonment of,the old contract and
the creation of a new contract." 30 Am. & ENG. ENcYc. or LAW, 1197.
To the contrary, see Galway v. Prignano, 134 N.'Y. Supp. 57I; McQuaid v.
Boughma-, 167 Ill. App. 430. It is impossible, however, by any devious
Toute of logic to avoid the fact that the only consideration for the defendant's
promise to pay is, after all, the doing of exactly what the plaintiff had already contracted to be liable for. Since these decisions are so well established it seems fair to assume that underlying all forms of expression, thf
real consideration is the plaintiff's forbearance to exercise the other choice
to which he was entitled.
Where a particular duty is imposed by law for the public good, there
is ordinarily only one mode by which the person owing the duty can free
'himself from its obligation, namely, performance according to the terms
expressed. A witness, for instance, within the jurisdiction of the court can
not free himself from the obligation of testifying by the payment of damages
-nor in any other way. And his giving of testimony is not consideration for
a promise. Collins v. Godefroy, I Barn & Ad. 950. So the obligation of
marital duties is not subject to satisfaction by anything except performance,
although circumstances may be such as to remove the obligation itself. Accordingly we find that thel performance of such duties by one who has no

HeinOnline -- 14 Mich. L. Rev. 483 1915-1916

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
right to relief therefrom, is not consideration for a promise. In re Kressler'sEstate, 143 Pa. 386; Merrill v. Peasley, 146 Mass. 46o. But performance when
the obligation might have been legally removed has been held a consideration. Moayon v. Moayon., 114 Ky. 855, 1o2 Am. St. Rep. 303; Phillips v. Meyers, 82 Ill. 67, 25 Am. Rep. 295.

The duties of public officers, although in form contractual, are primarily
imposed by law, and it-is uniformly held that the performance of such duties.
is not consideration for a contract. City of Rochester v. Campbell, iii N. E..
42o, (Indiana). The surrendering of property wrongfully possessed has.
also consistently been held not to constitute consideration. It might be
noted, parenthetically, that while the replevin statutes of most states allow
the defendant to retain possession of the property by indemnifying the
sheriff, this seems not to have been regarded as giving the defendant a
real option to render the property or its value as was the case in detinue.
Johnson v. Boehme, 66 Kan. 72, 97 Am. St. Rep. 357; Hall v. Law etc. Trust
Co., 22 Wash. 305: But see, Single v. Schneider, 24 Wis. 299.
It seems, then, that the only instances in which the courts appear to havedeparted from the rule that doing what one is already legally bound to do
is not consideration, are in fact instances in which the thing done was not
what the doer was obliged to do, but, rather, one of the things the choice of
which lay with him. There was therefore, logically even though not expressly, a very real consideration, and the cases are not departures from the
rule. In all other cases, the courts have rigidly adhered to the rule.
The writers both judicial and lay, who criticise this, admit frankly that
the rule is perfectly logical; they ascribe the desirability of a departure from
it to the practical advantage which business generally would derive. The
Turk who, in accord with custom, "tips" his postman and telegraph messenger
for performing their respective duties undoubtedly finds a very practical
benefit in so doing-there would otherwise be a discommoding number of
perfectly valid excuses for delays and mistakes. For the law to enforce
promises of additional compensation for the doing of one's legal duty, would
be to admit that its remedies, its enforcement of rights, are not equal to the
practicable possibilities. This may be the fact, but it is not so in the necessary theory. Legal sanction for such promises would tend very probably to,
increase the refusal to perform, for the sole purpose of exacting an unconscionable increase of compensation for performance. No one can say with
any certainty why the courts have so consistently followed a rule, so generally condemned as unreasonable, and to which no established rights constrain,
them. Criticism of the law as unresponsive to the reality of human relations is, in this instance, sound if there be no good reason for such a course.But the courts would not arbitrarily remain subject to such just criticism, and
it is therefore possible that, sub-consciously at least, courts have so acted
through fear of substituting a"tipping system" of unconscionable inducement
in the place of legal remedies.

J. B. W.
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